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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
The major purpose of this study was to determine the 
nature and characteristics of dismissal actions between 
Montana school boards and teachers; the effect of statutes 
as interpreted by the courts; the procedures involved in 
dismissal; the effect of the Montana Tenure Law on dis­
missal; and the effect of contract provisions concerning 
dismissal.
The practical purpose contemplated as an outcome of 
the above stated objectives was to make available such 
information for the guidance of administrators and school 
boards in dealing with teacher dismissals.
Since the courts are the only agencies permitted to 
interpret the law, an attempt by a layman to state the law 
in Montana on teacher dismissals will necessarily be only a 
reference, and must be considered as such. This paper is 
not an attempt to make any contribution to the legal pro­
fession; it is rather an attempt to present a general 
background of the problem of teacher dismissal in Montana, 
with the view that school boards will not be prompted to 
act as their own counsel, but that with some background, 
school boards will be better prepared to avoid situations
- 1-
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v/JaictL may render them liable to suits for damages on breach 
of contract.
The problem of teacher dismissal is very real, as 
any administrator who has had occasion to dismiss a teacher 
will testify. Aside from the matter of damages, there 
usually is much public indignation and talk. Problems of 
teacher dismissal should be handled honestly and with as 
little confusion as possible, in order to minimize ill feel­
ing. This can probably best be accomplished by following 
the procedure prescribed by Montana law, so that everyone, 
including the teacher, feels that justice has been done.
UEGAL BACKGROUND
Before undertaking a study in a particular legal 
field such as this, it may be well to review briefly the 
legal background of Montana law.
First, the Enabling Act under which Montana was 
granted statehood supersedes all other state laws. This act 
and its effect on Montana law is interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court.
Second, the Montana State Constitution as formed 
under the Enabling Act, is the basis for all Montana law.
The Supreme Court of the State of Montana interprets the 
State Constitution whenever the need arises in the form of 
test cases, and therefore the Supreme Court has a definite
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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influence in interpreting the meaning of the constitution.
The third source may be found in the statutes, or 
laws, passed by the State Legislature. These are also 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, but statutes may alter 
or change previous Supreme Court decisions as the laws are 
amended or changed.
The next level of authority may be found in what is 
commonly referred to as the common law. Common law may be 
considered as a body of legal doctrine composed of legal 
principles and precedents, developed through the years by 
various states. (The term common law may also be correctly 
applied to the English common law, as developed in England. 
English common law may have a great influence on American 
courts in the absence of American decisions pertinent to 
the question at hand.)
Montana courts may be expected to be influenced by 
other State court decisions, but they do not necessarily 
have to follow them even where the question is based on 
similar statutes. Also the Montana Supreme Court does not 
have to follow its own decisions as culture and customs are 
constantly in a state of flux, requiring the law to change 
along with them. Another point to be kept in mind is that 
the Montana Legislature is constantly changing and amending 
the law to conform to present day customs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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LIMTTATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The limitations of this study are important, and some 
of these limitations will be discussed here.
This study is not an attempt to analyze and classify 
the legislative acts and Supreme Court decisions of any 
state, other than Montana. Other state decisions are only 
resorted to when there are apparently no Montana cases 
pertinent. This study is not an attempt to analyze such 
things as; formal requisites of teacher contracts, duties of 
boards of education, certification requirements, tenure 
code, damages, and suability of school boards. The statu­
tory standards and Supreme Court decisions on each of the 
above topics would, however, constitute an independent and 
fruitful field of investigation. These points of law are 
only discussed here as they pertain to teacher dismissal.
The wording of the title of this study was selected 
in an attempt to delimit clearly the scope of this study.
The word ’’teacher” refers to "public school teacher,” and 
comprises principally those persons actually engaged in 
instruction in grades one to twelve. Superintendents do not 
come within the same classification as teachers.^
Chapter II will consider in much greater detail the 
meaning of the word "dismissal.”
Istate ex Rel. Howard v, Ireland, 114 M 488, 495» 
138 P 2d $69.
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CHAPTER II 
DISMISSAL
WHAT CONSTITUTES A DISMSSAL 
The term dismissal will be considered here as being 
the termination of a teacher's contract by the school board 
during the life of the contract or termination by the school 
board at any time after the teacher has attained tenure. 
Whether this dismissal of a teacher will give rise to a 
cause of action for breach of contract depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case.
The failure to secure re-employment at the end of the 
term does not ordinarily constitute a dismissal, and conse­
quently does not come within a statute prescribing the cause 
and manner of dismissal. In the absence of teacher tenure 
the right of a school board not to re-employ a teacher, no 
matter what the reasons, is absolute. The teacher has no 
vested right of contract. The Montana Supreme Court said 
in Eastman v. School District: "A school board may refuse to 
employ or re-employ a teacher with or without cause and need 
not give any reason for its action . . .
Other occurrences not deemed to be dismissals are 
closing of a school because of destruction or because of an
^Eastman v. School District No. 1 of Lewis and Clark 
County, 120 M 63, 180 P 2d 472, 479.
-5-
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epidemic, especially where the teacher is on hand, and is 
ready and willing to teach.^
Other reasons deemed not a dismissal include closing 
school because of lack of funds, and releasing the teacher 
when that particular job is no longer needed. In the latter 
case, that job must in fact no longer exist. In a New 
Jersey case, an attempt was made to transfer a full time 
principal to a teaching job, while at the same time creating 
a "new" job of part time principal and teacher to be filled 
by someone else. The court considered this an attempt to 
transfer to a lower position, and consequently a dismissal, 
not an abolishment of the job of principal.3
Some situations however, the court considers as being 
dismissals, where there is no actual discharge or cessation 
of teaching. Such was the situation in a Montana case where 
the court held that transfer to a lower grade constituted a 
dismissal.
While a regularly employed teacher may be discharged 
for a good and sufficient cause yet the board has no 
power to transfer a teacher from a higher to a lower 
grade. Assigning a teacher to a lower grade is a 
"removal" and just as much so as a dismissal would be.4
^Phelps V. Wayne County School District No. 109, 134 
N.B. 312, 302 111. 193.
3viemeister v. Board of Education of Borough of 
Prospect Park, 5 N.J. Super. 215, 68 A 2d 768.
^Smith V. School District No, 18, Pondera County,
115 M 102, 109, 139 P 2d 513.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In the above case the school board attempted to 
transfer a teacher from a teaching job in grades six, seven, 
and eight in a tOMi school, to a rural ungraded school con­
sisting of seven children in grades one through seven.
There was a dissenting opinion in this case to the 
effect that an elementary teaching certificate covers grades 
one through eight, therefore an elementary teacher should be 
qualified to teach at any elementary level. The almost 
universal adoption of a single salary schedule also will 
probably have some effect on the transfer of teachers.
From the context of this case and the above two 
points, the transfer of school teachers within the same 
school district would seem to depend on a comparison of the 
prestige of the two jobs, taking into consideration the fact 
that a teacher may be better qualified in one grade than in 
another.
Other courts have held that transfer of a principal 
to a teaching job,5 and transfer of a high school principal 
to an elementary principalship^ was the equivalent of a 
dismissal, and the teacher was not required to take the 
transfer.
^Viemeister, loc. cit.
^State ex Rel. Piper v. East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board, 213 La. 885, 35 S 2d 804.
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Most courts have held, however, that school boards 
have the right to dismiss teachers when an action of law 
closed the school. For instance, the Montana Supreme Court 
agrees with this as evidenced by its holding in Moses v. 
School District, where lack of sufficient number of pupils 
was held reason enough to dismiss the teacher.
Where teacher not notified that her services 
would not be required for next succeeding year, 
brought action to recover the amount she would 
have received if re-employed, having taught for 
three consecutive years entitling her to auto­
matic re-employment under this section, held, 
that because school was closed on the enrollment 
having fallen to two pupils, the board under Sec.
1044, R.C.M. 1935 (since repealed), had the 
power to close the school and void the contract, 
as well as under a clause of her contract pro­
viding that if school closed for lack of attendance the contract should be considered at an end.7
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Dismissal of a teacher in Montana is controlled by 
statute and, as is normal in these cases, that statute must 
be examined in the light of Montana Supreme Court decisions. 
The meaning of statutes is determined by the court according 
to the wording of the statute,̂  employing the best rules of
7Moses V. School District No. 53» Lincoln County, 
107 M 300, 305, 86 P 2d 407.
%cBride v. School District No. 2 of Silver Bow 
County, 88 M 110, 112, 290 P 252.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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graumar.9 if the grammar employed is not enough to ascertain 
the meaning of the statute, then the intent of the legis­
lature in enacting that law is used to determine what is 
meant. If neither of these methods suffice, then the court 
resorts to common law and decisions rendered by courts of 
other states.
The first statute to be considered is the one con­
cerning dismissal and appeal.
Dismissal— Appeal. In the case of the dismissal 
of any teacher before the expiration of any written 
contract entered into between such teacher and 
board of trustees for alleged immorality, unfitness, 
incompetence or violation of rules, the teacher may 
appeal to the county superintendent; and if the 
superintendent decides that the removal was made 
without good cause, the teacher so removed must be 
reinstated, and shall be entitled to compensation 
for the time lost during the pending of the appeal.
The courts seem to be in complete agreement that 
where statutes specify a procedure for dismissal this pro­
cedure must be followed.
The Montana Supreme Uourt seems to be in complete 
accordance with this as evidenced by what it held in several
9jay V. School District No. 1 of Cascade County 
24 M 219.
^ORevised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947 
(annotated) (Allen Smith Company, 1949,) Section 75-2411.
llln re Swink, 132 Pa. S. 107, 200 A 200; Gassen 
V. St. Charles School District, 199 La. 954, 7 S 2d 217; 
King V. Wells, 10 s.K. 2d 332.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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cases,^^and upon examination, the statute apparently says 
that when a teacher has been dismissed for any of the four 
specified reasons, the teacher may appeal to the county 
superintendent. This meaning as stated above is not what 
the Supreme Court has evidently held. By examining the 
statute word by word and looking to the court decisions on 
each part the meaning thereof should be clarified.
The word dismissal as used in the above statute has 
been discussed previously in this chapter.
The word "teacher" evidently means a teacher either 
part time or full time, and does not mean a University pro­
fessor or a superintendent. The Montana Supreme Court held:
The number of hours a teacher taught in a day is 
not a factor in determining her right to tenure.^3
This section, providing specifically for appeal 
to the county superintendent from an order dismissing 
a teacher has no application to an order of dismissal 
of a district school superintendent, the latter order 
being governed by section 75-1518 providing generally 
for appeal to the county superintendent from decisions 
of school officers and boards.
l^Home State Bank of Manhattan v. Swartz, 72 M 425, 
234 P 281; Hovland v. School District No. 52 of Stillwater 
County,  M  , 278 P 2d 211; McBride, loc. cit.
13state ex Rel, Saxtorph v. District Court,   M  ,
275 P 2d 209, 214.
Instate ex Rel, Howard v, Ireland, 114 M 488, 500, 
138 P 2d 569.
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As stated above in Howard v. Ireland the superin­
tendent does not come under the above statute, but evidently 
he would be entitled to the same consideration as a teacher 
under common law. This is clarified in the same case where 
the court further stated:
. . . while there is no statutory provision 
requiring a hearing before removal, there is a 
well-defined public policy declared by decisions 
of the supreme court that one in public office 
for a fixed term is entitled to such hearing to 
meet the demands of common justice and only a 
legislative act will warrant a deviation from it.15
The next part of the statute which the Montana 
Supreme Court has interpreted deals with the words "written 
contract,"
In Day v. School District the court held:
Where a teacher had taught school in the same 
district for three consecutive years under an 
informal contract, although the statute provides 
that such contracts shall be in writing, the 
board of trustees, by accepting the benefits of 
the teacher's services and in issuing warrants 
to her in payment thereof, will be held to have 
ratified the contract; ratification thereof was 
equivalent to full compliance with the neces­
sary formalities, and the contract thereupon 
must be considered as valid from its inception.1°
So, apparently, while this statute specifically
15lbid.
l6üay V. School District No. 21 of Granite County, 
98 M 207, 211, 38 P 2d 595.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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states that the contract is written, and also that the 
statute outlining the duties of trustees (75-1632-2) re­
quires a written contract, such is not required under 
certain conditions.
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL
As a general rule, a removal for a cause not author­
ized by statute or contract and outside the discretionary 
power of school authorities is i n v a l i d . G o o d  cause suffi­
cient for removal of a teacher may consist of any cause that 
renders him unfit to be a teacher in the public school, so 
that the best interests of the school require that he should 
be removed or dismissed.
A very recent (1954) Montana case is very much in 
point concerning the part of the statute on dismissal for 
alleged immorality, unfitness, incompetence or violation of 
rules. The court’s ruling is quoted:
Board of school trustees had the right and 
power under statute to discharge a teacher only 
for immorality, incompetence, unfitness or 
violation of rules adopted by board and made 
a part of teachers contract by reference, and 
discharge of teacher on any other ground would 
constitute a breach of such contract,19
1778, C.J.S. Schools, Section 202, 1079.
l^Davis V. School Committee of Somerville, 30 N.E. 
2d 401, 307 Mass. 354.
19Hoviand, loo, cit.
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This interpretation of the statute is very explicit 
and seems to limit teacher dismissal to the four reasons 
indicated. The court also says that the trial judge prop­
erly instructed the jury as follows:
You are instructed that our statutes give a school 
board the right and power to discharge a teacher for only the following causes: (1) immorality, (2) incom­
petence, (3) unfitness, (4) violation of rules.
Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the school board dismissed the plain­
tiff on any ground other than those listed above, then you must find that the school board breached its contract with the plaintiff.20
This language as used by the Montana Supreme Court 
leaves little doubt as to what constitutes sufficient reason 
to dismiss a teacher. The next step logically would be to
determine the meaning of the terms immorality, incompetence,
unfitness, and violation of rules.
One of the two Montana cases in point, is Kellison v. 
School District^^ where the school board dismissed Kellison 
for immoral conduct. The father of a female pupil accused 
Kellison of misconduct toward his daughter. Just what that 
conduct was is not stated, although there appears in the 
court record, the words, "indecent proposals."
Upon review of the evidence a couple of months later
ZOlbid., P 212.
^^Kellison v. School District No. 1 of Cascade County 
20 M 153, 50 P 421.
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the board reversed its decision and expunged from its 
records all matter pertaining to the case.
The second Montana case is Hovland v. School District 
where the court states:
The "rules," a violation of which gives the school 
board the right and power to discharge, are the rules 
and regulations adopted by the board and made a part of the teacher’s contract by reference.22
This case holds that Hovland was not dismissed for 
failure to follow rules of the board, but that she was dis­
missed for failure to follow rules prescribed by the super­
intendent and that the statute refers to rules of the board 
not to rules of the superintendent.
Since there are not enough Montana cases to establish 
what would be deemed sufficient cause for dismissal of a 
teacher, an examination of various other states’ cases 
should help. These cases are listed under the four reasons 
enumerated by the Montana statute justifying dismissal. If 
a case does not specifically fall under one of the Montana 
causes for dismissal that case appears under miscellaneous.
Immorality
School teacher held guilty of "misconduct" justi­
fying dismissal by school board where he entered 
school building in evening with young ladies without 
turning on lights.23
22Hovland, loc. cit.
23Grover v. Stovall 237 Ky. 172, 35 SVf 2d 24, 26,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Plaintiff in this case was a teacher in the 
public schools, and was so circumstanced as that 
both patrons and pupils regarded him in the light 
of an exemplar whose conduct might be followed by 
his pupils, and the law by necessary intendment de­
mands and requires that he should not engage in any 
conduct inevitably calculated to invite criticism 
and of a nature and character justly productive of suspicions of immorality.24
Board of education of Memphis City Schools had 
right under statute to dismiss teacher who had made 
ungrounded charges that there was organized immoral­
ity in certain school.25
Evidence that teacher failed to disclose to 
school district board that she was engaged in bus­
iness of distribution and selling malt beverages, 
and that she procured liquor license in teacher's 
name for purpose of misleading Liquor Control Board 
which would not have issued the license to teacher's 
father who operated the business, justified 
teacher's dismissal on ground of "immorality.
Incompetence
A teacher, although employed for a definite 
length of time, who proves to be incompetent, and 
unable to teach the branches of instruction he is 
employed to teach, either from lack of learning or 
from want of capacity to impart learning to others, 
or in any other respect fails to perform the obliga­
tions resting upon him, may be dismissed from such 
employment by the proper authorities, for, when he 
accepts such employment, he agrees by implication 
that he has the learning necessary to enable him to 
teach the branches that are required, as well as 
that he has capacity in a reasonable degree of im­
parting that learning to others; he agrees also
^̂ Ibid. P 24.
25Hayslip v. Bondurant, 250 S.W. 2d 63, 64, 194 
Tenn. 175.
^^Appeal of Batrus, 26 A 2d 121, 148 Ap, Super 587,
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that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence 
in the advancement of his pupils in their studies, 
and in preserving harmony, order and discipline.2y
Evidence that school teacher acted as waitress, 
and on occasion, as bartender, in husbands beer 
garden after school hours and during summer 
vacations, that in husband’s beer garden and in 
presence of pupils, teacher took a drink of bear, 
served beer to customers, and shook dice with 
customers for drinks, played and showed customers 
how to play a pinball machine, justified dismissal of teacher on ground of ’’incompetency. "28
. . , appellant’s rating was below that of a 
properly qualified teacher; that he used ungrammat­
ical language; that he failed to comply with 
requirements as to the flying of the national flag; 
that he was unable to properly instruct his 
pupils; and that his "discipline’’ and "motivation" 
were poor.
Evidence and findings established petitioner’s 
lack of ability or fitness to discharge required 
duties of a teacher, and supported finding of 
incompetency as a cause for termination of 
teacher’s contract.29
Evidence sustained action of board . . .  in 
dismissing school teacher on ground that physical 
disability rendered teacher incompetent to perform 
her duties.30
An isolated case of reasonable corporal punish­
ment by a school teacher does not constitute
27Crawfordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200.
28Horosko v. School District of Mount Pleasant, 6 A 
2d 866, 335 Pa. 369.
29in re Lane, U  A 2d 573, 573-4, 141 Pa. Super.
259.
^Oioucks V. Board of Education of City of Amsterdam, 
16 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 258 App. Div. 1003.
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incompetency as cause for removal or disciplinary action.31
Pregnancy constitutes "incompetency” under 
Teacher Tenure Act, and justifies termination of 
contract on that ground since it renders teacher 
physically incapable to discharge her duties.32
Evidence that school teacher who was of ad­
mittedly good morals and who intellectually and so 
far as teaching ability was concerned was competent, 
signed an election nomination paper for a candidate 
of Communist Party, and that several protests were 
received after newspaper published his name, was 
insufficient to warrant teachers dismissal under 
the statute on ground of "immorality," or "incompetency."33
IrVhere statute imposed on public school teacher 
the duty of teaching students by precept and 
example, honesty and patriotism, school board was 
justified in removing as incompetent a teacher who 
was a conscientious objector, opposed to partici­
pation in war and to service vâthin combat or 
noncombat forces of the United States.34
A teacher, in accepting employment, implicitly 
agrees that he has the learning necessary to enable 
him to teach the branches to be taught, and that 
he has the capacity in a reasonable degree of 
imparting that learning to others.35
31watts V. Viiinn Parish School Board, 66 3. 2d 350.
32west Mahonoy TP. School District v. Kelly, 41 A 
2d 344 156 Pa. Super. 601.
33Board of School Directors of School District of 
Borough of Wilmerding, Allegheny County, v. Gillies, 23 A 
2d 447, 343 Pa. 382.
34state ex rel. Schweitzer v. Turner et al Members 
Board of Public Instruction, 19 3 2d 832, 155 Fla. 270.
3 5Biggs V. School, City of Mt. Vernon, 90 N.E. 105, 
45 Ind. App. 572.
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Unfitness
Mental condition unfitting teacher to instruct 
or associate with children is sufficient cause,3o
Insubordination and failure to recognize consti­
tuted authority may render teacher unfit for service 
in school even though her qualifications are otherwise sufficient,37
Violation of Rules
Rule adopted by board of education requiring all 
classroom teachers to take a mental ability test 
v/as reasonable, and the refusal to comply therev/ith 
would justify cancellation of contract of employment of tenure teacher for insubordination,38
A regulation requiring teachers to be residents 
of school district would be a reasonable require­
ment, violation of which would constitute a ground 
for dismissal.39
Where contract between teacher and consolidated 
school district required teacher to observe the 
rules of the district board, and although teacher 
was assigned to the fourth and fifth grades, she 
took charge of the seventh grade, and did not 
offer to teach in the position assigned to her, 
teacher's conduct amounted to a plain neglect of 
duty justifying her dismissal by the board, . , ,40
36soard of Education of San Francisco Unified School 
District V. Mulcahy, 123 P 2d 114, 50 Cal, App, 2d 518,
3?Board of Education of City of L,A. v. Swan, 261 
P 2d 261 41 C. 2d 546,
38state ex rel Steele v. Board of Education of 
Fairfield, 40 So, 2d 689, 252 Ala, 254.
39Jones v. School District of Borough of Kulpmont,
3 A 2d 914, 333 Pa, 581.
40consolidated School District No, 4, Bryan County,
V. Millis, 139 P 2d 183, 192 Okl, 687.
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VJillful refusal of teacher to obey reasonable rules and regulations of employing board of
education constitutes insubordination as ground 
for dismissal.41
In view of rule of Board of Education requiring 
a teacher or other employees of any school district 
governed by such board to answer questions of any 
legislative committee relating to present or past 
membership in any organization advocating forceful 
overthrow of government, and provision of 
Education Code prohibiting the advocacy and 
teaching of Communism, refusal of a teacher to 
answer questions of State Senate Committee 
concerning her activities in Communism constituted 
unprofessional conduct, authorizing her discharge.42
School boards may adopt and enforce such reasonable 
rules governing the management of their affairs 
and the conduct of teachers and other employees as 
may be proper.
Teachers violation of school board rule for­
bidding female teacher to marry, would not be 
ground for termination of teacher's contract under 
Teacher Tenure Act, since board was not empowered 
to make such rule.43
Two absences from school by permanent teacher 
without leave do not constitute persistent course 
of conduct authorizing his removal for violation 
of or refusal to obey school board's rules and 
regulations.44
4lBoard of Education of City of L. A. v. Swan, 261 
P 2d 261, 410 2d 546.
42soard of Education of City of L.A. v. Wilkinson, 
270 P 2d 82, 115 C.A. 2d 100.
43aoff V. School District of Borough of Shenandoah 
et al, 35 A 2d 902, 154, Pa. Super. 239.
44Fresno City High School District v. DeCaristo,
92 P 2d 668, 33 Cal. App. 2d 666,
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Miscellaneous
Complaint . . . wJiich charged school teacher with 
inefficiency in teaching and in management of 
classes, resulting from inability to maintain 
discipline, refusal to accept correction from 
supervisors, and use of language to children which 
was unfitting and unladylike in a teacher, was 
sufficient to give the commissioner jurisdiction 
to hear and determine the charges made against theteacher.^5
Evidence that principal failed to conform to 
accepted and recognized standard as to supervision 
of instruction, failed to give proper direction to 
teachers, and failed properly to coordinate courses 
of study from year to year, sustained charge of 
willful and persistent negligence, so as to 
authorize his dismissal.
Evidence supported finding that principal 
wilfully, and persistently violated school laws and 
his contract in failing to conduct monthly fire 
drills as required by lav/, so as to justify his 
dismissal.^®
Refusal to accept teaching assignment may 
constitute willful and persistent negligence, justifying dismissal.47
Evidence warranted teacher's dismissal for 
persistent negligence in time of arrival at school 
in morning, and in not furnishing county school 
superintendent with copy of daily program for hisapproval,48
45state ex rel. Cochrane v. Peterson, 294 M  203> 
208 Minn. 361.
46swick V. School District of Borough of Tarentum, 
25 A 2d 314, 344 Pa. 197.
47Appeal of Ganaposki, 2 A 2d 742, 332 Pa. 550»
48spruce Hill 'IP School District v. Bryner, 25 A 
2d 745, 148 Pa. Super. 587.
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A teacher has the right to inflict reasonable 
corporal punishment upon a pupil for insubordination, 
disobedience, or other misconduct, but he had no 
right to inflict punishment to enforce an unreasonable 
rule, and the punishment must not be inflicted with 
such force or in such manner as to cause it to be 
cruel or excessive.
The conduct of teacher in whipping pupil with a 
paddle made of flooring was sufficient to justify 
school board in discharging teacher, where pupil was 
punished twice on the same day, the first time for 
suggesting a riddle and the next time because he 
threw a paper wad at the teacher.49
Failure to control pupils is ground for dismissal, 
even though the teacher is not unfaithful in the discharge of his other duties.50
Evidence as to severe beating inflicted by teacher 
and principal upon 12 year old school boy as corporal 
punishment was sufficient to justify removal of 
principal and teacher.51
A teacher's refusal to accept an assignment which 
school board has power to make constitutes a violation 
of school laws for which he may be dismissed.52
The violation of teacher's oath of patriotism and 
allegiance prescribed by school code, justifies 
revocation of his credentials and constitutes 
"unprofessional conduct," within meaning of provisions 
of code governing dismissal.53
49Berry v. Arnold School District 137 SW 2d 256, 199 
Ark. 1118.
50Eastman v. Rapids District Tp., 21 Iowa 590.
5lHoueye v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 6? S 2d 
553, 223 La. 966.
52commonwea 1th ex rel VIesenberg v. School District of 
City of Bethlehem, 24 A 2d 673» 146, Pa. Super. 250.
53Board of Education of City of Eureka v. Jewett, 68 
P 2d 40421 Cal. App. 2d 64.
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Teacher*3 advocacy before public school pupils of 
election of particular candidate for public office 
held "unprofessional conduct" warranting suspension of teacher.54
Evidence sustained finding of board of education 
that teacher was guilty of misrepresentation and fraud 
in making of application for loan, and that thereby 
teacher was guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher, 
justifying teacher's dismissal.55
City superintendent of schools, who participated 
in bringing charges against members of board of 
education before state board of education because of 
board’s interference with superintendent in his lawful 
rights and duties, was held not guilty of "insubordin­
ation" so as to authorize his removal, since charges 
were brought in his individual rather than his official capacity.56
Where public school teacher wrote to former 
student who failed to register under Selective Service 
Act, congratulating student on his "courageous and 
idealistic stand" and stating that "you and others who 
take the same stand are the hope of America," the 
board of education was warranted in removing teacher for "cause."57
Findings that permanent teacher and school 
principal made derogatory statements and used 
undignified language with reference to school admin­
istrative officers, continuously disregarded rules, 
attendance at meetings called to assist principals 
in their work, patently suggested to teacher's 
violation of rule requiring that classroom keys be
54aoldsmith v. Board of Education of Sacramento City 
High School, 225 P 783, 66 Gal. App. 157.
55smith V. Carty et al, 199 A 12, 120 N.J. Law 335.
56smith V. Board of Education of Ludlow 94 SW 2d 321, 
264 Ky. 150.
57Joyce v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 60 
N.E. 2d 431, 325 111. App. 543.
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left in the principal's office, and refused to accept 
two teaching assignments warranted her dismissal.
Teacher refusing request of county health officer 
and schools authorities to remain away from school 
until he recovered from smallpox held subject to 
discharge.59
Evidence that school teacher was often late, that 
he left building during school hours for extended 
periods of time, that he did not regularly assign 
lessons, that long periods of time elapsed between 
assignments of lessons and recitation thereof, that 
he brought snake to school, experimented with 
explosives, cracked coconuts and played checkers 
with students during school hours, warranted his 
dismissal by board . . .°0
A fist fight in the office of the superintendent 
of schools in a public school building by the 
superintendent and a high school teacher in a 
subordinate position held sufficient to justify the 
school district board in dismissing the former for 
cause, after notice and hearing.®1
Where teachers in New York City schools refused 
to answer questions asked of them by Senate 
Investigating Committee, whether they were 
Communists, on ground that their answer might tend 
to incriminate them, they were properly dis­
charged. . .
58Board of Education of City of L.A. v. Swan, 261 
P 2d 261, U  C. 2d 546.
590verstreet v. Lord et al 134 So, 169» 160 Miss. 44*
60cadman v. School Directors of School District No.
14 Winnebago County, 6 N.B. 246, 288 111. App. 627.
^^Arehart v. School District No. 8 of Hitchcock
County, 289 N.W. 540, 137 Neb. 369*
62Daniman v. Board of Education of City of New York,
118 N.Y.S. 2d 487, 488.
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Evidence was sufficient to justify conclusion 
that teacher in public high school, who was a member 
of the Communist party, was fully acquainted with 
policies and purposes of Communist party and 
justified discharge of such teacher on ground that 
she advocated and participated in un-American or subversive doctrines.«3
This is not an attempt to list every reason deemed 
justifiable or not, as the case may be, for the dismissal of 
teachers. It is rather a sampling of cases to present a 
general picture of what may or may not be sufficient reason 
to dismiss a teacher. Other reasons will appear, or have 
already appeared in this paper.
It must be remembered also, that many teachers are 
dismissed arbitrarily without any legal action being taken. 
The above list includes only those cases that have reached 
the supreme courts of the various states.
While the power and duties of the board of trustees, 
and the procedures involved in teacher dismissal will be 
covered in detail in later chapters, a synopsis of them as 
they pertain to causes for dismissal follow here.
The board of trustees has the power and duty to hire 
and dismiss teachers, but this function must be carried out 
in a judicial manner. The board should act only after due 
consideration of the evidence, and without passion, pre­
judice, or caprice. Statutory procedure on teacher
^3Appeal of Albert, 92 A 2d 663, 372, Pa. 13.
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dismissal must be followed with proper notice and hearing, 
so that teachers are dismissed in a fair and proper manner. 
Since the Montana Supreme Court has stated that teachers 
may be dismissed only for alleged immorality, unfitness, 
incompetence, or violation of rules, school boards should 
justify dismissal under one of these four reasons.
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CHAPTER III 
EFFECTS OF TEACHER TENURE
MONTANA TENURE LAW
In Montana the teacher tenure act was first enacted
in 19131 re-enacted in 1921, and amended in 1939 and 1949.
As it now (1955) stands it reads as follows:
Re-election of teachers —  when automatic —  
acceptance. After the election of any teacher or 
principal for the third consecutive year in any 
school district in the state, such teacher or 
principal so elected shall be deemed re-elected 
from year to year thereafter at the same salary 
unless the board of trustees shall by majority vote 
of its members on or before the first day of April 
give notice in writing to said teacher or principal 
that he has been re-elected or that his services 
will not be required for the ensuing year, but in 
this written notice, the board of trustees, if 
requested by the teacher or principal, must 
declare clearly and explicitly the specific reason 
or reasons for the failure of re-employment of such 
teacher. The teacher or principal, if he so 
desires, shall be granted a hearing and reconsid­
eration of such dismissal, before the board of 
trustees of that school district. The request for 
a hearing and reconsideration must be made in 
writing and submitted to the board of school 
trustees within ten (10) days after receipt of such 
notice of dismissal. The board of trustees must 
hold a hearing and reconsider its action within 
ten (10) days after receipt of such request for 
a hearing and reconsideration. Provided that 
nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent 
the re-election of such teacher or principal by 
such board at an earlier date, and also provided 
that in case of re-election of such teacher or 
principal, he shall notify the board of trustees 
in writing within twenty (20) days after the 
notice of such re-election of his acceptance of 
the position tendered him for another year and failure to so notify the board of trustees shall
- 26-
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be regarded as conclusive evidence of his 
nonacceptance of the position.1
PURPOSE
In general the purpose of a tenure law is to give 
teachers security in their positions and to protect them 
against removal for unfounded or political reasons, and to 
benefit the public generally by assuring a competent and 
efficient teaching force. This general purpose has been 
stated by the Montana Supreme Court in the following 
language ;
, . . the teacher tenure act is based upon the 
public policy of protecting the educational 
interests of the state . . .  it should be construed 
liberally to effect the general purpose of the act.2
The purpose of enabling the Teacher Tenure Act is 
not merely to insure teachers teaching employment, but to 
insure to teachers, who have held teaching positions for 
three or more consecutive years, security in the position, 
grade, or status which they have thus attained.3
The New Jersey court states it thus:
The tenure provisions of the school laws were 
designed to aid in the establishment of a competent
^Revised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947  
( a n n o t a t e d )  (Allen Smith Company, 1 9 4 9 , )  Section 7 5 - 2 4 0 1 .
2state ex Rel. Saxtorph v. District Court, __ M___
2 7 5  P 2d 2 1 5 .
3smith V. School District No. 1 8 ,  Pondera County, 
1 1 5  M 1 0 2 ,  1 0 9 ,  1 3 9  P 2d 5 1 8 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
—28—
and efficient school system by affording to princi­
pals and teachers a measure of security in the ranks 
they hold after years of service and should be given 
liberal support consistent with legitimate demands for government economy.4
The Missouri court says;
The general purpose of teacher tenure statutes 
is not to grant special privileges to teachers as 
a class but to protect and improve state education 
by retaining in their positions teachers who are 
qualified and capable and who have demonstrated 
their fitness and to prevent dismissal of such 
teachers without just cause.5
EFFECT OF TENURE LAW ON DISlîISSAL 
There are four general situations that could eiist 
where teachers might be dismissed. The failure of a school 
board to re-employ a non-tenure teacher (sometimes referred 
to as probationary teachers) at the end of the contract is 
the first situation. Situation number two is dismissal of 
a probationary teacher during life of the contract. Situ­
ation number three is the dismissal of a tenure teacher 
during the life of the contract. While the fourth and last 
situation concerns dismissal of a tenure teacher at the 
end of the school year.
The first situation above, as previously discussed
4viemeister v. Board of Education of Borough of 
Prospect Park, 5 N.J. Super. 21$, 68 A 2d 768.
Estate ex Rel. Wood v. Board of Education of the 
City of St. Louis, 206 8.W. 2d $66.
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in Chapter II, is not really a dismissal and re-employment 
rests with the pleasure of the hoard without danger of 
legal complications.
The Montana Code section on teacher dismissal 
previously discussed in Chapter II makes no distinction 
between tenure and non-tenure teachers. It specifically 
states "dismissal before the expiration of any written 
contract," which seems to include both kinds of teachers.
It appears, therefore, that cases of dismissal before the 
expiration of the contract for both tenure and non-tenure 
teachers will be treated under that section of the code. 
Since there is no distinction between tenure and proba­
tionary teachers either under Montana Statutes or Supreme 
Court decisions, these two situations will be considered 
together, as being a dismissal during the life of the 
contract.
The last general situation whereby a teacher might 
be dismissed occurs under the teacher tenure coda which 
specifies conditions precedent to dismissal of tenure 
teachers at the end of the contract. From reading the 
tenure law and cases in point, the legislative intent seems 
to be to bring dismissal of tenure teachers at the end of 
the contract in line with dismissals during the year. If 
such is the case, an examination of each kind of case as 
to specifications for dismissal should clarify the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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situation. An examination of the tenure law follows with, a 
comparison of dismissal during the life of the contract.
NOTICE
The tenure law requires written notice to the 
teacher, before April 1, that his services will no longer be 
required for the ensuing year. The Montana Supreme Court 
has clarified the word "notice" somewhat, by the following:
. . . Held, in a teacher’s action for breach of 
contract, that the statutory provision became a part 
of the contract of employment, binding upon both the 
teacher and the board of trustees; that the notice 
of dismissal must be clear and explicit, and that, 
no such notice having been given, plaintiff was 
automatically re-elected for the ensuing school year 
and entitled to recover the salary due her for the 
first month of that year as prayed for in the 
complaint.^
The requirements of this section with regard to 
notice of termination of employment are not manda­
tory and need not be strictly construed against 
school district in favor of teacher, but the act 
should be liberally construed to effect general purpose.7
A notice given to a teacher by school board that 
it "decided not to renew your contract" substan­
tially complied with this section and was sufficient 
to terminate teacher’s contract of employment.°
A conversation between teacher and chairman of
McBride v. School District No, 2 of Silver Bow 
County, 88 M 110, 112, 290 P 252.
7Eastman v. School District No. 1 of Lewis and Clark 
County, 120 M 63, 180 P 2d 472, 479.
Sjbid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-31-
board of trustees of school district in which 
chairman orally informed teacher that board had 
decided not to re-employ teacher did not comply 
with statute requiring "written notice" to teacher 
on first day of May [since changed to April] that 
his services would not be required for ensuing 
year.9
Teacher’s alleged statements that he did not 
wish to continue as teacher did not relieve school 
district of statutory duty to notify him in writing 
of intention not to re-employ him.10
An employment contract with a teacher in 
continuing service status may be cancelled by 
mutual agreement between the teacher and the board 
of education without notice and an opportunity for 
hearing as provided by the statute.11
Notice then does not have to follow wording of the 
statute as long as it is clear and explicit, but it must 
be given by April 1, and for tenure teacher at end of the 
year it must be written.
For notice required to a tenure or a probationary 
teacher upon dismissal during the year the various state 
courts do not seem to be in agreement. But in general this 
notice does not have to be in writing unless required by
statute.12
^Smith, loc. cit.
lOcommon School District No. 2? of Gasconade County 
V. Brinkmann 233 S.W. 2d 7o8.
llEnzor v. Faircloth, 43 So. 2d 811.
l^Arehart v. School District No. 8 of Hitchcock 
County, 289 N.W. 540, 137 Neb. 369.
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This notice must, however, be given to the teacher in 
some form or other.^3
HEARING
Statutory provisions become a part of a contract^A- so 
a request for a hearing and the time limits involved being 
very explicitly stated in statute would have to be followed. 
However, the manner and methods involved are not stated in 
the statute. Montana defines a hearing as:
A hearing as to the fitness of a district school 
superintendent to act as such presupposes that 
charges were preferred, that notice had been given 
the incumbent to enable him to prepare for and refute 
the charges, that evidence was taken at the hearing 
with opportunity for cross-examination of the wit­
nesses —  all for the pufpose of determining in a 
judicial manner the truth or falsity of the charges.^5
A district school superintendent appointed under 
this section by the board of school trustees, occu­
pies a different position from that of a teacher 
employed under section 75-1632; he is the executive 
officer of the board and as such a public officer, 
and while there is no statutory provision requiring 
a hearing before removal, there is a well-defined 
public policy declared by decisions of the supreme 
court that one in public office for a fixed term is 
entitled to such hearing to meet the demands of 
common justice and only a legislative act will 
warrant a deviation from it.^6
13lbid.
14Home State Bank of Manhattan v. Howard, 72 M 425, 
234 P 281.
15state ex rel. Howard v. Ireland, 114 M 488, 495, 
138 P 2d 569.
l̂ Ibid.
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It has been generally stated by courts that a hearing 
should consist of: (1) The common law ideal of fair pro­
cedure should be followed, including the requirement of 
sworn testimony, cross examination, rebuttal, formal intro­
duction of evidence, right of subpoena, etc. (2) The 
admission of only trustworthy evidence, such as is generally 
understood under our system of government and jurisprudence.
(3) Privileged communications had in confidential relation­
ships should be shielded for social reasons. (4) The 
witness should be protected from self-incrimination or 
involuntary confession.
The school board in these hearings is acting in a 
quasi-judicial capacity and a verdict based on the evidence 
presented, in the absence of prejudice, is final and will 
not be set aside by the courts. Failure to grant the 
hearing or the manner in which it is conducted will, 
however, be subject to review by the court. The Montana 
Court held:
In this, [this refers to teacher employment! and 
all like questions properly coming before them, the 
members of the board act in a quasi-judicial 
capacity, and with the proper exercise of their 
discretion and judgment, the courts will not inter­
fere. The record here does not show an abuse of 
discretion on part of any of the school authori­ties. 17
^7Kelsey v. School District No. 25 of Custer and 
Rosebud Counties, 84 M 453» 2?6 P 26, 27.
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That the courts will not interfere with the 
discretion of school officials in matters which the 
law has conferred to their judgment, unless there 
is a clear abuse of that discretion, or arbitrary 
or unlawful action, seems to be the unanimous 
holding of the authorities.4°
It is unquestionably the policy of this state, as 
declared by the Legislative Assembly, that ordinary 
school controversies shall be adjusted by those who 
are specially intrusted with that duty. It is not 
the policy to encourage resort to the courts in such 
matters. So long as the school officers act legally 
and within the power expressly conferred upon them the courts will not interfere.49
This agrees with the general rule throughout the 
United States as evidenced by what the Louisiana Court held:
The reasons for dismissal of a teacher are largely 
in the discretion of the school board, . . . and 
unless it is clearly shown that the board has abused that discretion, the courts will not interfere.20
While the Hovmrd case above applies to a district 
superintendent, the court's language implies that any public 
official is entitled to a hearing. Vfhether a teacher would 
be entitled to one or not, seems to be clarified in Kelsey 
V. School District:
We think it is the general rule that a teacher 
who has a contract for a definite term cannot be
4%tate ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 M 200, 263
P 433.
49state ex rel. School District No. 86 of Richland 
County V. Trumper, 69 M 468, 222 P 1064.
20gtate ex rel. Piper v. East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board, 213 La. 885, 35 S 2d 804.
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discharged before the expiration, without cause or without hearing.21
In the Kelsey case above, the court does not mention 
tenure (Kelsey was a non-tenure teacher), they only state 
the general rule for a teacher. It would seem therefore, 
that although a notice might not be required by law in any 
case except when the board does not intend to re-employ a 
tenure teacher, a hearing is required in all cases. A 
hearing was held in all Montana Supreme Court cases of 
dismissal. In the Kellison case, the court held that 
Kellison could not complain that he had no hearing upon 
dismissal, as a hearing was subsequently held at a later 
date.22
PROCEDUEE
The procedure under the Montana tenure statute has 
been outlined by the Montana Supreme Court as follows:
In taking the right of tenure from a teacher, the 
law provides that certain steps shall be taken:
(1) The school board shall, on or before the 
first day of April, give notice in writing 
to the teacher that his (or her) services 
will not be required for the ensuing year;
(2) The school board, if requested by the 
teacher, shall declare clearly and
2lKelsey, 0£. cit., P 454*
22Kellison v. School District No. 1 of Cascade 
County, 20 M 153, 50 P 421.
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ezplicitly the specific reason or reasons 
for the failure to re-employ such teacher;
(3) The School board, if requested by the teacher
shall grant a hearing and reconsideration of 
such dismissal to such teacher;
(4) The school board must hold such hearing and
reconsider its action within ten days afterreceipt of such request.23
Procedure under common law would follow much the same 
form with the possible exception as to time limits, with a 
reasonable time substituted for specific time under the 
statute.
VIhen does the teacher become a tenure teacher? 
According to the statute, the teacher acquired tenure after 
election for the third consecutive year. This wording has 
been repeated time after time by the Montana Supreme Court, 
so evidently the wording is clear and explicit and needs no 
further explanation. Election would mean signing of the 
contract for the third year or an automatic acceptance after 
April first if the school board did not give notice of 
intent not to re-employ. The word consecutive has not been 
clarified by our court, so what is meant by third consecu­
tive year will be left to a future decision.
The statute also means that this automatic re-election 
will be at the same salary and under terms of the same
23saxtorph, op. cit. P 214.
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contraot. The Montana court has held:
This section providing that when a teacher has 
served three consecutive years in any district in 
the state she shall be deemed re-elected from year 
to year unless given notice on or before the first 
day of May [amended, now April] that her services 
will not be required for the ensuing year, means re­
employment under the same terms and conditions as the preceding year’s employment.24
The purpose of the teacher tenure act being not 
merely to insure teaching employment, but also secur­
ity to teachers in the position, rank, grade or 
status they have attained.25
APPEAL
The right to appeal to higher authority upon dis­
missal is generally statutory and Montana agrees with this 
general rule.
The provision in the school law that in case of dis­
missal of a teacher, before the expiration of her written 
contract, she may appeal to the school authorities becomes 
as much a condition of the contract as if expressly written 
therein.
From the action of the board in discharging the 
plaintiff she had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy —  
by appeal first to the County Superintendent, and, having
2%oses V. School District No. 53 of Lincoln County, 
107 M 300, 305, 86 P 2d 407.
25Smith, loo. cit.
26Kelsey, loc. cit.
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been unsuccessful in that, to the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction.27
Montana Statutes provide for appeal on dismissal,
first to the County Superintendent (Section, 75-2411),28
and then to the State Superintendent (Section, 75-1418).29
The time limit within which this appeal must be
taken is not covered by statute, but there is a court
decision on time for appeal:
No time having been fixed by statute within which 
an appeal may be taken from the decision of a county 
superintendent of schools, and in the absence of 
regulations by the state superintendent with relation 
thereto, the appeal may be taken within a reasonable 
. time after the making of the decision, a limitation 
of six months being deemed reasonable.30
VffiAT IS TEACHING 
Another point under tenure to be considered concerns
the amount of time a teacher must spend teaching to enable
her to become a tenure teacher. In Saxtorph v. District 
Court, where Saxtorph taught only in the mornings, the 
court held:
n^ha number of hours a teacher may teach in a day
27saxtorph, op. cit. , P 217.
2 %  ont ana Code, op.* 2Ü* » ^ 956. 
291bid., P 875.
30Trumper, loc. cit.
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is not a factor in determining her right to tenure.”31
The kind of teaching and character of services 
rendered by the teacher determine whether the teacher 
acquires tenure rather than oral or written agreements with 
the board of trustees,32
SUMMARY
The Montana Teacher Tenure Act will be liberally 
construed to effect the purpose of the act, which apparently 
is in improving education in Montana by giving teachers some 
security in their jobs.
After a teacher has been elected for the third 
consecutive year the school board must give notice not to 
re-employ, and this notice must be in writing, stating 
clearly and explicitly that teacher’s services will not be 
required for the ensuing year. If the teacher so requests, 
the school board must state causes for not employing and 
conduct a hearing on these causes or reasons. This hearing 
by the school board must be conducted with the board acting 
as a judicial body. The board should hear evidence, swear 
witnesses, cross-examine and weigh the evidence without 
prejudice.
31Saxtorph, op.» cit. , P 215.
32Holbrook v. Board of Education of Palo Alto, 221 
p 2d 205.
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The tenure act has no material effect on teacher 
dismissal during the life of a contract where common law and 
statutes prescribe that dismissal should be for cause and 
not arbitrary. A written notice is not required, but a 
proper hearing is required.
Upon dismissal a teacher may appeal to the County 
Superintendent and then to the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, and if it is shown that these school 
officials (including the board of trustees) acted within 
their discretionary power, the courts will not interfere.
The Montana Attorney General had this to say on the 
Montana Tenure Lav/:
Helena - Local school boards cannot fire 
teachers with tenure rights without legal grounds, 
and teachers about to be dismissed are entitled to 
written notice specifying the reasons.
Attorney General Arnold H. Olson said this in 
an opinion for Ravalli County Attorney E. Gardner 
Brownlee.
"A teacher or principal who has acquired tenure 
right by virtue of employment for three consecutive 
years may be deprived of this right only for legal 
cause,” Olsen said.
He added, "If requested, the school board of 
trustees must furnish a written statement of charges 
against the teacher" whose contract is not renewed 
and "charges made must be substantiated by 
evidence with the right of the teacher to refute 
the charges with evidence offered in defense."33
33Associated Press dispatch. The Daily Missoulian 
pkvontan^ , July 13, 1955*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV 
OTHER FACTORS EFFECTING DISMISSAL
DAA'IAGES
The first case in Montana that seems in point con­
cerning damages for breach of contract is LeClair v. School 
District, and that case only stated that plaintiff (LeClair) 
must tender her services to school authorities before 
damages could be proved.^
The second Montana case concerns Smith v. School 
District. where Smith sued to recover his yearly salary 
less what he might earn during the year. The Montana 
Supreme Court upheld Smith and he recovered.^
Ordinarily, the damages recoverable by a teacher for 
his wrongful discharge or removal from his position are the 
actual damages suffered by him as a result thereof. Damages 
for injury to his business reputation or for mental suffer­
ing have been held not recoverable in such an action. The 
amount of the damages consists of the full yearly salary 
unless the contract was broken during the year, and then 
damages would be only for the remainder of the contract.
^LeClair v. School District No. 28 of Lake County, 
74 M 385, 240 P 391.
2smith V. School District No. 18 of Pondera County, 
115 M 102, 139 P 2d 518.
-41-
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School teacher could not recover damages for 
injury to business reputation and for mental 
suffering by reason of wrongful discharge by school board.3
A principal wrongfully discharged could recover his 
salary, including not merely the amount due at the time of 
the action, but full damages for breach of a three-year 
contract.4
A teacher or other similar employee of a school 
organization generally has a duty to mitigate the damages 
resulting from his wrongful discharge or removal from his 
position by using all reasonable diligence to secure other 
similar employment of the same kind and grade, provided 
such employment is obtainable by him at a place reasonably 
convenient to him. Courts of various states have stated 
the following on mitigation of damages:
Where principal and school teacher was wrongfully 
discharged, he was not required to accept employment 
as fourth grade teacher in the same school, . . .5
An employee, demanding damages for alleged breach 
of his contract of employment, may rest his case 
upon proof of a valid contract and its breach, the 
measure of damages being the contract price of his 
services. Mitigation of damages is an affirmative
3Durst V. School District No. 2 of Niobrara County, 
273 P 675.
orvat v. Jenkins Tp. School District, 10 A 2d 
390, 337 Pa. 193.
Estate ex rel. Freeman v. Sierra County Board of 
Education, 49 N.M. 54, 234 P 2d 234.
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defense, and its burden is entirely on the contract 
breaker. This burden is not sustained by showing 
that the injured party was offered employment, 
though similar to that contracted, unless at a 
place reasonably convenient to him. And earnings 
he actually received in dissimilar employment 
should not be credited on his contractual damages, 
unless the employment is shown to have been incom­
patible with his contractual service.6
In the above case, the plaintiff was a grade school 
principal, and the work done, in mitigation of damages that 
were not allowed, consisted of supervising adult education 
at night.
In action for breach of teaching contract, 
plaintiff was not required, in order to mitigate 
his damages, to seek employment in any line of 
service other than that in which he was employed by defendant.7
In determining employee’s damages for employer’s 
breach of contract, renumeration subsequently 
received by employee is subject to deduction for 
reasonable cost in obtaining such subsequentemployment. 3
In the above case, a school superintendent obtained 
a similar position at another school which necessitated 
reasonable expense of $100 in moving. Such amount was a 
reasonable deduction to be allov/ed from the total sum
%artin v. Board of Education of Lincoln County, 120 
W. Va. 621, 199 3.E. 887, 888.
7Edgecomb v. Traverse City School District 341, Mich. 
106, 67 N.W. 2d 87, 88.
% a y  V. Board of Education of Pond Creek, 194 Okla. 
472, 153 P 2d 233.
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received at new position, in mitigation of damages.
DUTIES AM) POVJERS OF THE BOARD 
In general, powers and duties of school boards are 
purely statutory and are limited to those powers expressly 
conferred by statute or necessarily implied from those 
conferred.
Since the Montana Supreme Court held that one of the 
reasons for dismissal of a teacher would be violation of 
school board rules, an examination of those rules should be 
relevant. Under Montana Code, the board of trustees has 
the power to prescribe and enforce rules not inconsistent 
with law for their own government of schools under their
supervision.9
In a Montana case, the court decided that a school 
board rule to require retirement at a certain age was in 
violation of the teacher retirement act, and was therefore
of no effect.10
The Alabama Court held that a rule requiring teachers 
to take a mental abilities test was reasonable.H
^Revised Codes of the State of Montana, 1947 
(annotated! (Allen Smith Company, 1949), Sec. 75-1832 (1).
lOAbshire v. School District No. 1 of Silverbow 
County, 124 M 224, 220 P 2d 1058.
llstate ex rel. Steele v. Board of Education of 
Fairfield, 40 So. 2d 689, 252 Ala. 254.
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A rule requiring scJiool teachers to be residents of 
the school district was held reasonable in Pennsylvania, 
while a board rule against marriage was held unreasonable.^3
The school board should furnish a copy of rules or 
regulations to the teacher, or see to it that the teacher is 
notified of them, or the court will not consider them as 
being part of the contract.
Under the power to hire and dismiss teachers the law 
specifies method and factors involved in contracts.
To employ or discharge teachers, mechanics or 
laborers, and to fix and order paid their wages; 
provided, that no teacher shall be employed except 
under resolution agreed to by a majority of the 
board of trustees at a special or regular meeting; 
nor unless such teacher be the holder of a legal 
teacher's certificate in full force and effect. All 
contracts of employment of teachers, authorized by 
proper resolution of a board of trustees, shall be 
in writing and executed in duplicate by the chairman 
and clerk of the board, for the district and by the
teacher.13
In Jay v. School District the court held a contract 
as being void where no legal teacher’s certificate was held
12Jones V. School District of Borough of Kulpmont, 3 
A 2d 914, 333 Pa. 581.
13soff V. School District of Borough of Shenandoah 
et al, 35 A 2d 902 154, Pa. Super. 239.
14Blodgett V. Consol. School District No. 36 of Scott 
County, M App. , 86 S.V-. 2d 374.
15Montana Code, ojo. cTb. , Section 75-1632 (2).
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by teacher.Evidently, the court would hold other con­
tracts as being void if any part of the above statute was 
violated. A void contract is of no legal significance, and 
the school board could dismiss the teacher arbitrarily.
STATUTORY DUTIES OF THE TEACHER
The fact that statutes become a part of teacher 
contracts by reference has been established in many Montana 
cases, some of which have appeared above. In view of that 
situation, the Montana Supreme Court would evidently hold 
that violation of those statutory duties would justify 
dismissal of a teacher by the board of trustees.
Violation of a statutory duty by a school teacher 
does not seem inconsistent with the court’s holding in 
Hovland v. School District, whereby a teacher could be 
dismissed for only four enumerated reasons, because the 
Montana Court would necessarily add violation of a statu­
tory duty.
These statutory duties would probably be considered 
as general contract provisions, violation of which would 
justify dismissal as being a breach of contract.
No attempt was made here to enumerate these statutory
^^Jay V. School District No. 1 of Cascade County, 
24 M 219.
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duties as they may be found in any book of Montana school
laws.47
CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
The usual common law rule is that persons may con­
tract to do anything not contrary to law or public policy.
So in general, contract provisions concerning teacher dis­
missal are valid unless they are in violation of law. The 
Oklahoma Court has stated; "A contract between a . . . 
school district and a teacher may provide grounds for dismis­
sal of the teacher in addition to the statutory grounds."48 
In the Montana case of Hovland v. School District 
the court apparently held that if there had been a contract 
provision specifying dismissal for failing to obey rules and 
regulations of the superintendent, then dismissal would have 
been justified. The court's holding is quote;
Where the contract of employment of high school 
teacher did not provide for her discharge for 
failure to cooperate with high school superintendent, 
act of board of school trustees in discharging 
teacher solely for alleged lack of cooperation with 
superintendent in failing to obey rules laid down 
by him was arbitrary and constituted a violation of 
teacher's contract, . . .49
47scJiooi Laws of the State of Montana. 1953. (Great 
Falls: Tribune Printing and Supply Co., 1953)» P 250.
43Qonsolidated School District No. 4» Bryan County 
V. Millis, 192 Okl. 187, 139 P 2d 133.
49Hovland v. School District No. 52 of Stillwater 
County,  M __, 278 P 2d 211.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-48—
Again in Moses v. School District, the Montana Court 
said in effect that, since the teacher’s employment contract 
contained a provision making it void upon closing of the 
school, the board was justified in dismissing the teacher 
when the board did in fact close the school,20
A general assumption, then, is that, if the school 
board desires the right to dismiss teachers for reasons 
other than statutory, contract provisions to that effect 
would be upheld by the courts providing these contract 
provisions were not against public policy (marriage, smok­
ing, etc.) or against the law (politics, religion, race, 
etc#) •
20&:oses V. School District No. 53 of Lincoln County, 
107 M 300, 305, 86 P 2d 40?.
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CHAPTER V 
SUmiARY
Dismissal is the termination of a teacher's contract 
by the school board daring the life of the contract or at 
any time after the teacher has attained tenure, and this 
termination will give the teacher the right to sue for 
breach of contract.
Failure of a school board to re-employ a probationary 
teacher at the end of the term is not a dismissal, and the 
school board may re-employ or not as the board sees fit. 
Transfer of a teacher within a school district to an equiva­
lent job is not considered a dismissal, therefore boards of 
trustees may do so. The closing of a school by an action of 
law gives the board the right to let a teacher go, but 
generally closing of the school for other reasons will con­
stitute a dismissal, if the board discharges the teacher.
Dismissal in Montana is controlled by statute and the 
Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to permit 
school boards to dismiss teachers only for alleged im­
morality, unfitness, incompetence or violation of rules. 
Therefore when a school board desires to dismiss a teacher 
the board should enumerate its reasons so as to fall within 
one of these four categories.
The Teacher Tenure Act was passed to give teachers 
security in their positions and to protect them against
-49-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-50-
removal for unfotuided or political reasons, and to benefit 
the public generally by assuring a competent and efficient 
teaching force. After a teacher has been elected for three 
consecutive years the teacher will be deemed re-employed 
from year to year unless the board takes affirmative action 
to dismiss. The law specifies a written notice by April 
first and if the teacher requests a hearing, that request 
must be granted. This law applies only to the teacher after 
the third election, and then only at the end of each year.
For dismissal of either a tenure or a probationary 
(one who has not attained tenure) teacher during the life of 
the contract there must be a notice and a hearing. The 
notice would not necessarily have to be written. The hearing 
must be carried out in a fair and impartial manner with due 
notice to such things as: sworn witnesses, proper intro­
duction of evidence, cross-examination, rebuttal, and 
protection of the witnesses on seIf-incriminâtion and 
privileged communications.
Upon dismissal of a teacher by a school board the 
teacher may appeal to the County Superintendent, and then to 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. This appeal 
must be within a reasonable time, and if the teacher is 
still not satisfied, court action may be taken. If it is
shown that these school officials acted within their dis­
cretionary power, and that legal procedures were followed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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as to notice and hearing the courts will not interfere.
One of the powers and duties of the board of trustees 
is to employ and dismiss teachers, and this must be carried 
out according to statutory provisions, as the board has no 
more legal power than has been granted to it by statute.
There are three general methods for board control of 
teachers and their dismissal. Violation of statutory 
duties on the part of the teacher constitutes grounds for 
dismissal, as statutory provisions become a part of the
contract. Boards may also control teacher dismissal by 
rules and regulations adopted by the board for the governing 
of the school, but the teacher must in fact have knowledge 
of these rules and regulations. The last general method of 
control of the teacher by the board is by provisions in the 
contract of employment.
In case of dismissal of a teacher by a school board 
without cause the teacher has an action in court for breach 
of contract. Recovery in court of the amount of damages 
will be for the face value of the contract minus any salary 
already paid and any earnings by the teacher in another job 
of similar duties and in the same locality.
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